ABSTRACT: Since 1991, the Italian national government can dissolve municipal councils when infiltration by organized crime is suspected (Law 164/1991). We exploit variation over time and space in the application of this law to study voters' responses to politicians' publicly exposed ties to criminal organizations. Using a difference-indifferences approach, we find that public exposure of ties to organized crime significantly depresses turnout in local elections, and negatively impacts the electoral performance of incumbents and purely local political parties. The breach in the local political principal-agent relationship also translates into citizens' reduced willingness to contribute to the financing of local public goods.
1.

Introduction
Electoral accountability lies at the heart of our conception of democracy (Barro 1973 Previous research in this field predominantly concentrates on the electoral and broader social effects of politicians charged with specific illegal activities such as, for instance, embezzlement of public funds, corruption or accepting bribes. In this article, we take a broader perspective and are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to explicitly analyse the effects of politicians' publicly exposed ties to criminal organizations. Although this is arguably a very specific form of corruption (Gambetta and Reuter 1995; Heywood 1997 Luca 2015) . Investigating voters' reactions to politicians' publicly exposed ties to organized crime thus is critical to evaluate whether the democratic process in itself can be an effective tool in restraining the (political) influence of criminal organizations.
Our empirical analysis employs data from southern Italian municipalities in the regions of Calabria, Campania and Sicily covering the period 1985-2013. We select these three regions because the mafia has traditionally been concentrated here, and the set of municipalities in our analysis thus becomes restricted to those that are sufficiently comparable in terms of the potential involvement of organized crime in local politics (Sberna 2011; Daniele and Geys 2015) . Our identification strategy then is based on a law created by the Italian national parliament in 1991 aimed at reducing the impact of organized crime on local politics (Law 164/1991). Law 164/1991 states that the national government has the power to dissolve a municipal council -and appoint a temporary technocratic government -whenever any evidence arises of direct or indirect ties between local politicians and organized crime. Since its introduction in 1991, several council dissolutions for presumed mafia infiltration have been enforced every single year. In total, 254 dissolutions have taken place over the period 1991-2014. Importantly, the enforcement of this law within a given municipality at a specific point in time represents an exogenous shock to the local political establishment, since its occurrence and timing is fully determined at the national level. Furthermore, and crucially, it implies the public exposure of incontrovertible evidence of ties between local politicians and criminal organizations, which is likely to induce a sharp change in citizens' perceptions of local politicians. Hence, variation over time and space in the application of this law provides a unique opportunity to test the electoral reactions to such mafia-related scandals using a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy.
Comparing political outcomes in municipalities with and without the enforcement of Law 164/1991 before and after its enforcement, we show that public exposure of politicians' ties to organized crime causes a statistically significant drop in voter turnout during subsequent local elections. This is in line with previous studies showing a decrease in voter turnout following alternative cases of corruption (Caillier 2010; Bauhr and Grimes 2013) , and indicates that voters express their dissatisfaction with the political class at least in part through increased abstention. Importantly, while we observe a similar drop in voter turnout in national elections taking place in the years immediately following local council dissolutions, this drop is much weaker (i.e. approximately 30% to 40% of the drop in local turnout). The difference in the strength of both effects strongly suggests that voters' discontent is specific to local politicians, or, at least, that voters are able to largely target the expression of their discontent to the local political level. In line with such interpretation, we also find that the enforcement of Law 164/1991 has a negative impact on the electoral performance of the incumbent party (which is most clearly implicated by the council's dissolution) as well as purely local political parties (which we show are more likely to be in power when council dissolutions take place). Instead, voters appear to turn towards local chapters of national parties. This is particularly true for nationally active left-wing parties, which have traditionally been less affected by mafia infiltration (see Dickie 2005 ).
Finally, we also find evidence of a significant decrease in local government's ability to collect fiscal revenues in the period immediately following a council dissolution for presumed mafia infiltration. Voters thus appear to become less willing to pay local taxes or contribute to the financing of local public goods when they perceive local politicians as being delegitimized by mafia connections. This finding is consistent with the idea -well-known from social exchange theory (Blau 1964; Akerlof 1982 
Institutional Framework
Law 164/1991
Following a period of intense mafia-related killings, the Italian government reinforced its organizations. Given the specifics of the decision process, its timing is also unpredictable by the local population, such that the exact moment of the dissolution remains unexpected. This allows us to exploit these dissolutions as the basis for our identification strategy when studying voters' responses to politicians' publicly exposed ties to criminal organizations (see below). We should also note in this respect that since 34 municipalities have seen their council dissolved twice (and seven municipalities even had a third dissolution), we restrict attention to the first dissolution that occurs in any given municipality. Later dissolutions are presumably less informative or unexpected, and thus are less likely to induce a sharp change in citizens' perceptions of local politicians.
Local political system
Local government in Italy is organised along a parliamentary system, and consists of a legislative branch (Consiglio, or local council) and an executive branch (Giunta, or local government). Both local political institutions are headed by the mayor. During municipal elections, citizens directly elect the councillors (Consiglieri) and -since 1993 -the mayor (Sindaco). Importantly, not all 8000 Italian municipalities hold elections at the same time, but they do all operate on an electoral cycle of similar length (i.e. five years). Consequently, local elections are effectively quasi randomly distributed across municipalities in a five year cycle.
After an election, the mayor is in charge of appointing a certain number of aldermen (Assessori) depending on the population size of the municipality. Municipal councils have important powers in terms of local taxes (particularly taxes on property) and the provision of public goods (for instance, culture and recreation, transport, economic development, education, waste management, local police and social welfare).
3.
Empirical analysis
Estimation Strategy
As indicated above, we use the exogenously imposed enforcement of Law 164/1991 to identify voters' responses to the public exposure of politicians' ties to organized crime. We particularly exploit the temporal and geographical variation in these shocks to local politics via a difference-in-differences approach comparing municipalities with/without the enforcement of Law 164/1991 before/after its enforcement. Using subscript i for municipalities and t for time, the baseline specification is:
Y i,t covers a set of political outcomes at the municipal level at time t, which can be expected to be dependent upon citizens' perceptions of the integrity -or lack thereof -of the local Given that these outcomes by definition are specific to elections, the time dimension of the analysis at this point includes only election years. In addition, we extend previous work by also analysing local governments' ability to collect local fiscal revenues, which evaluates the extent to which any breach in trust in the local political principal-agent relationship translates into citizens' lower willingness to contribute to the financing of local public goods (as predicted by social exchange theory; Blau 1964; Akerlof 1982; more details below). Since this information is available on a yearly basis, the analysis here includes all years. The exact operationalisation of these various dependent variables is provided in subsequent sections below.
Our main explanatory variable in equation (1) is AfterDissolutioni,t. It is operationalised as an indicator variable equal to one in municipalities dissolved for ties between local politicians and criminal organizations in the period after the dissolution (0 otherwise). To assess the temporal persistence of any observed effects, we thereby distinguish between the first election following the mafia-related council dissolution (i.e.
First election after dissolution)
and all subsequent elections after the dissolution in our sample (i.e. Later elections after dissolution). Throughout the analysis, we furthermore include a full set of municipality fixed effects (α i ) as well as a full set of year fixed effects (Year t ). The former intend to capture any (un)observed heterogeneity across municipalities, while the latter account for time-specific elements common to all municipalities. Finally, in some specifications we also introduce province-year fixed effects, which accommodate for the potential influence of any type of time-varying changes at the provincial level (we have 19 provinces in our sample). Summary statistics are reported in Appendix 1.
Clearly, as mentioned above, a central assumption underlying our empirical approach is that the dissolution of local council reveals new information to voters about their political principals (thus representing a novel signal about the quality of local government), and that this information is widely disseminated within the local population. The informationdissemination assumption appears trivially acceptable since the dissolution of one's municipal council is unlikely to go unnoticed among voters. The new-information assumption is more difficult to verify directly, but complete confirmation of citizens' priors would not induce any significant effects in the analysis below. Furthermore, our use of municipality fixed effects (α i ) (as well as province-year fixed effects in some models) captures citizens' priors about local-level corruption.
Voter Turnout
In (1), (3) and (5) focus on the immediate effect of politicians' publicly exposed ties to criminal organizations in the first election after the dissolution, whereas columns (2), (4) and (6) also assess the presence of any longer-term effects across subsequent elections after the dissolution. In each case, several sets of results are provided. Columns (1) and (2) exclude province-year fixed effects, which are included in columns (3) to (6). Moreover, Columns (1) to (4) include all available observations, whereas columns (5) and (6) restrict the sample to municipalities where Law 164/1991 is enforced at some point in time. While the latter leads to a very restrictive sample particularly in panel I, it confines our inferences to the sample of municipalities where organised crime is most obviously politically active in the period under analysis -whether or not it has already been revealed. As such, it goes some way towards controlling for possible unobserved differences between municipalities with and without mafia infiltration, and arguably can provide an estimate of the mafia revelation effect distinctly from the mafia infiltration effect.
_______________________ Table 1 about here
_______________________
The results in panel I of Table 1 show that publicly exposing local politicians' ties to criminal organizations has an important effect on voter turnout in subsequent municipal elections. The coefficient estimates suggest that voters become statistically significantly less likely to participate in local elections, with an estimated effects size of 2.8 to 3.9 percent in the first election after the dissolution. Even in the very restrictive samples used in column (5) and (6), the estimated effects remain statistically significant and substantively meaningful.
Interestingly, columns (2) and (4) indicate that the effect also appears to be quite persistent over time. While this observation cannot be confirmed in column (6), it should be observed that the number of observations for dissolved municipalities in later elections in this sample is very small, which substantially undermines the power of our test procedure in this instance. 
Party choice
Our findings thus far illustrate that voters react to politicians' publicly exposed ties to criminal organizations by increased abstention on Election Day. This section takes the analysis one step further and turns to the potential effects of mafia-related corruption scandals on voters' party choice. Previous research has highlighted an important negative effect of publicly exposed corruption on the incumbent's -or incumbent party's -vote share (e.g., Table   2 -which follows the same format as Table 1 -evaluates the presence of a similar effect in our setting. We therefore estimate equation (1) using an indicator variable equal to one if the incumbent party (i.e. the party in power at the time of the dissolution) is re-elected in postdissolution elections as the dependent variable. We expect 1 <0.
_______________________ Table 2 about here
_______________________
The results in Table 2 are in line with our expectations, and suggest a statistically significant drop in incumbent's probability of retaining control over the local council in post-dissolution elections. Across all specifications in Columns (1) to (4), the estimated effect size is also substantively meaningful, since the incumbent party's probability of winning the elections after a mafia-corruption scandal declines with 11 to 17 percent. Columns (5) and (6), however, provide substantially weaker results in terms of effect size and statistical significance. Although the power of the analysis here is reduced by the fact that the number of observations is only 10% of the sample in Columns (1) to (4), some caution is clearly required in assessing the impact of a mafia-corruption scandal on the local incumbent's probability of re-election.
Intuitively, negative effects on the incumbent party's electoral appeal would seem obvious to arise, since this party is clearly most immediately implicated by the council dissolution. Table   2 does not indicate, however, whether such effects would similarly arise with respect to the overall local party system. Table 3 therefore extends the analysis to all political parties active within a given municipality, and assesses more generally whether -and, if so, in which direction -voters' political preferences shift following the public exposure of local politicians' ties to organized crime. In this case, the dependent variable(s) when estimating equation (1) is a set of four indicator variables set to 1 if a specific political party wins the local elections. We thereby consider four groups of political parties: i.e. purely local parties (i.e. without clear affiliation to national parties), left-wing, right-wing and centrist parties.
The results are summarized in Table 3 . The top panel of Table 3 shows the results when concentrating on the first election following the council dissolution, whereas the bottom panel also includes any potential effects in later elections after the enforcement of Law 164/1991. To preserve space, we only report the results when including province-year and municipality fixed effects, but the results are qualitatively unchanged considering different specifications (details upon request).
_______________________ Table 3 about here
The key findings in Table 3 On the one hand, Dickie (2005) presents substantial anecdotal evidence suggesting that the Italian Communist party had been immune to mafia infiltration until its dissolution at the end of the 1980s. It is at least conceivable that the same observation persists to some degree also for current Italian left-wing parties. On the other hand, purely local parties might be more likely to be infiltrated by criminal organizations since, in stark contrast to the local divisions of national or regional parties, they are not accountable to any higher-level organization.
To further substantiate this interpretation, we turn to an analysis of the probability that local councils are dissolved for suspected mafia infiltration in Table 4 . The estimation model is given by (with subscript i for municipalities and t for time):
The dependent variable i,t is an indicator variable equal to one for municipalities where the local council is dissolved in the year before the enforcement of Law 164/1991. The key independent variables -captured by , -are a set of indicator variables equal to 1 if a given political party is in power in municipality i in year t. As before, we thereby consider four groups of political parties: i.e. purely local parties, left-wing, right-wing and centrist parties. As such, the model evaluates the probability that a certain political party controls the municipal council at the time of the enforcement of Law 164/1991 (i.e. at the time of the mafia-corruption scandal). Based on our discussion above, we would expect a higher (lower) probability of mafia-related dissolutions in municipalities governed by purely local (left-wing) political parties.
_______________________ Table 4 about here
The results in Table 4 are broadly consistent with our expectations. That is, we observe that municipalities governed by purely local parties (which constitute the reference category in Table 4 ) are most likely to be dissolved for suspected mafia infiltration. The coefficient estimates for all other parties are indeed negative. Moreover, we observe the strongest effect -in terms of both statistical significance and estimated effect size -for left-wing political parties. These parties thus appear least likely to be dissolved for suspected mafia infiltration.
Consequently, citizens' observed shifts in party choice in the aftermath of a mafia-related council dissolution (see Table 3 ) can at least in part be rationalized by the fact that purely local parties are indeed most likely to be accused of having ties with the mafia. 
Local fiscal revenues
Overall, our findings in Tables 1 to 4 To assess this, we estimate equation (1) Italian municipalities tend to be financially dependent on a strong ability of local revenue collection. Generally, such revenues derive partly from local taxes (e.g., on properties and waste disposal) and partly from retributions charged for locally provided public goods (e.g.
kindergartens, local public transport, and museums).
The results are summarized in Table 5 . Note that we do not restrict the sample to electoral years in this analysis since we observe the evolution of the revenue indicator on a yearly basis. Furthermore, since the commissioners nominated by the national government might have had an impact on local government performance, we extend equation (1) with an addition indicator variable equal to one in the year(s) of the commissioners' government (i.e.
Under Law 164).
_______________________ Table 5 about here
_______________________
The results in Table 5 are indicative of a drop in the ability of revenue collection after a mafia-corruption scandal. Interestingly, the effect appears to arise almost immediately, since we observe negative point estimates already during the period of the commissioners' government (though this generally remains statistically insignificant at conventional levels).
The observed effects strengthen to approximately 3.5 percentage points when a new local government is appointed after the first round of post-dissolution elections, which is equivalent to about 20% of a standard deviation. Such findings are consistent with the idea that voters react to politicians' breach of the psychological contract underlying the local political principal-agent relationship via their tax payments. 3 Nonetheless, columns 3 and 4
clearly illustrate that the drop in revenue ability is not persistent over time, but rather improves again after later elections. Hence, the local political class appears to be able to redeem itself over time. This lack of persistence in corruption's revenue effects over time is also observed in Timmons and Garfias' (2015) study of revealed financial corruption and tax compliance in Brazilian municipalities. 4 They suggest that continued information about corruption may be crucial to sustain a link between politicians' integrity and tax compliance, which may also play some role in our setting.
To more comprehensively assess the timing of the observed effects, Figure 3 depicts the results when using a more flexible functional form, which allows for more detailed temporal variation in the estimated effect of mafia infiltration. Specifically, rather than including only indicator variables for the first and later electoral periods following the mafia-related council dissolution (i.e. First election after dissolution, and Later elections after dissolution), we include a set of time-specific dummy variables (D+x) that take value one only for municipalities put under commissioners in the years x and x+1 subsequent to the dissolution of the government due to (presumed) mafia infiltration (with x = 2,…,14). Note that the postdissolution period starts two years after the actual dissolution since the appointed commissioners govern the municipality for a period of 12 to 24 months (see above).
Moreover, we look at bi-yearly periods to maintain sufficient observations for dissolved , and gradually strengthens until six to seven years after the dissolution. Afterwards, the ability of revenue collection recovers and even becomes somewhat higher than in municipalities not involved in a mafia-corruption scandal by the end of our observation period (i.e. 14-15 years after the dissolution). This temporal pattern suggests that the first government elected after the mafia-corruption scandal -and in power for the five-year term in years two to seven after the dissolution -suffers most strongly from voters' reaction to politicians' breach of the psychological contract, but that later governments experience a redemption effect.
Conclusion
This Finally, we provide evidence that the apparent breach in trust in the local political principalagent relationship has effects also beyond the electoral arena. In fact, significant detrimental effects can likewise be observed with respect to citizens' willingness to contribute to the financing of local public goods. Local fiscal revenues represent an important source of income for Italian municipalities, which is directly managed by the city council, and our results suggest that voters mete out punishment for exposed corruption via their tax payments -in line with predictions from social exchange theory (Blau 1964; Akerlof 1982; Frey 1993a, b) . 
Figure 3: Municipality councils dissolved for mafia infiltration across regions
Note: The figure shows the results from a difference-in-differences regression analysis using as dependent variable the ratio between actually collected revenues and the total amount of assessed revenues that a municipality should collect within the year. Under Law 164 reflects the period during the enforcement of Law 164/1991 when the three appointed commissioned govern the municipality, whereas D+x reflects the years x and x+1 subsequent to its enforcement (with x = 2,…,14). All models include a full set of time-province and municipality fixed effects. The left-hand panel employs all available observations, whereas the right-hand panel restrict the sample to municipalities where Law 164/1991 is enforced at some point in time. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the municipality level indicated at the bottom of the figure. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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